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The purpose of this paper is to develop a model of hierarchies based
on the allocation of authority. We take the view that a firm's owners have
ultimate authority over a firm's decisions, but that they have limited time
or capacity to exercise this authority. Hence the owners must delegate some
authority to subordinates, i.e., they must grant the subordinates the right
to make decisions that they themselves are unable or unwilling to make.
However, these subordinates also have limited time or capacity to exercise
authority and so further delegation must occur to other subordinates. Thus we
view a firm as a chain of command over decisions. We use our model to
analyze the optimal chain of command given that different agents have
different tasks; in particular, some agents are engaged in coordination and
others in specialization. Our theory throws light on the nature of hierarchy
and the optimal degree of decentralization inside a firm, as well as on the
boundaries of the firm.
There is a vast literature on many of the issues we consider, and this
is not the place to provide a review. Economists have studied hierarchical
structure from the point of view of supervision and task assignment (see,
e.g., Williamson (1967) and Rosen (1982)); from the point of view of
incentive theory (see, e.g., Calvo and Wellisz (1979)); and from the point of
view of information processing and team theory (see, e.g., Keren and Levhari
(1979), Radner (1992), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), and Segal (1998)). By
and large, however, the existing literature does not analyze hierarchy in
terms of authority; that is, in contrast to our model, it is not the case
that if i is above j in the hierarchy, then i necessarily has authority over
j. Rather, in much of the literature, if i is above j in the hierarchy, then
j provides information to i.Also the literature does not distinguish
between what happens inside a firm and what happens between firms.In other
2words, the optimal hierarchies derived could apply just as well to the
organization of production in the U.S.A. as to the organization of production
in Microsoft.In contrast, our approach does distinguish between the firm
and the economy. In our model, one firm has one person or group with
ultimate authority over all decisions (one owner or group of owners), whereas
the economy has many people with ultimate authority over different subsets of
decisions (many owners or groups of owners).1
Although our approach differs from much of the literature, it has
parallels with the paper by Aghion and Tirole (1997). In our model, a boss
(e.g., an owner) has formal authority in the Aghion—Tirole sense, while a
subordinate has real authority if his boss cannot exercise authority but he
can. We discuss the relationship further in Section 5.
The basic elements of our model are as follows. We consider an economy
consisting of a set of assets and a set of identical individuals. Each asset
represents a (residual) decision; that is, a decision must be taken with
respect to that asset. We assume that these decisions are noncontractible,
both ex ante and ex post. In addition to these basic decisions, there are
also "higher—level decisions, which correspond to the coordination of assets
or to synergies among assets.2 To be precise, we assume that, for each
subset of assets A, there is a task t, which consists of trying to come up
with an idea about what to do with the assets in A. A task does not
11n future work, it would obviously be desirable to combine the informational
approach in the literature and the authority approach in this paper.
2Decisions rather than assets are the key feature of the model. We introduce
assets because they are a convenient way to think about decisions,
particularly higher—level decisions (synergies).
3necessarily reach fruition, that is, become an idea ex post. If an
individual's task becomes an idea, we say that the individual is active.In
this case he will carry out his idea if he can.If the individual does not
have an idea, he is inactive; in this case not only can the individual not
implement his own idea, but also he cannot implement anyone else's.
Because any particular individual may not have an idea, it is important
for efficiency that each asset has a hierarchy of bosses, that is, a chain of
command. The way a hierarchy works is as follows. If the first person in
the hierarchy (the ultimate boss) has an idea, she implements it.If she
does not have an idea, control passes to her subordinate, who implements his
idea if he has one.If the subordinate does not have an idea, the
subordinate's subordinate has a chance to implement his idea, and so on.
A key assumption that we make is that ideas are mutually exclusive in
the following sense.If one individual implements an idea involving an
asset, then someone else cannot implement an idea involving that asset
(whether or not the idea involves other assets too). This assumption has a
significant implication. The benefit of putting someone high up in a
hierarchy is that, if the person has a good idea, he is likely to be able to
implement it. The cost is that the person may block others from implementing
better ideas.
A (stylized) example may help. Imagine that there are two assets, a
hotel and an airplane. Then there are three tasks: coming up with an idea
about the hotel; coming up with an idea about the plane; and coming up with
an idea about how to coordinate the hotel and the plane (synergy). The model
supposes that these ideas conflict. For example, the synergy" idea to offer
hotel discounts to airplane passengers is inconsistent with the "hotel' idea
to refurbish the hotel in the next three months.
Assume that there are three individuals, one carrying out each task.
4One hierarchical structure would make the coordinator-—that is,the person
working on the hotel-plane synergy——senior on both assets.In this case, if
the coordinator is active, i.e. ,hasan idea, she can implement her idea,
whether or not the specialists have ideas, since she has authority.In
contrast, each specialist can implement his idea only if (a)he has one; (b)
the coordinator does not.
Another hierarchical structure would reverse the roles: the coordinator
would be junior to the specialists on both assets. In this case,each
specialist can implement an idea whenever he has one,while the coordinator
can implement her idea only if (a) she has one; (b)neither specialist does.
(If either specialist implements his idea, this preempts the use of oneof
the assets, which means that the coordinator cannot implement heridea.)
A priori it is not clear which of these two hierarchical structuresis
better, although the second one seems unconventional.It is in fact an
implication of one of our main results that the secondhierarchical
structure is suboptimal (given some additional assumptions).
Returning to the general case, we assume that the organizational
form——characterized by a chain of command over each asset and an assignment
of tasks to each individual-—is chosen ex ante to maximize expectedtotal
surplus. From the design point of view, the key questions are,what tasks
should each individual be assigned to carry out and what is the optimalchain
of command for each asset? One of our principal results is that, giventhe
assumption that the probability of an idea is decreasing inthe set of assets
being looked after, individuals with a broad remit, i.e.,whose tasks cover a
large subset of assets, should appear higher in the chainof command than
those with a narrow remit. In other words, big thinkers or coordinators
should be senior to small thinkers or specialists. We also establishthat
'criss—croSs" hierarchies are never optimal; that is, if individual i appears
5above individual j on one asset, j will not appear above i on another asset.
Finally under an additional assumption, we show that the optimal hierarchy
is a pyramid, in the sense that each individual has at most one boss.
We use these results to analyze the trade-off between centralization
and decentralization. We define an organization to be centralized if most
individuals in it are coordinators, and an organization to be decentralized
if most individuals in it except for the top people are specialists. We show
that if the gains to coordination are large enough, it is optimal for the
organization to be centralized; if the gains to coordination are significant
but not too large, it is optimal for the organization to be decentralized;
and finally if the gains to coordination are small, then it is optimal for
the organization to split up into several independent firms.
The paper is organized as follows. We set out the model in Section 2.
In Section 3 we establish our main result, that individuals with a broad
remit should be senior to those with a narrow remit. In Section 4 we provide
a detailed analysis of the symmetric two—asset case. Section 5 is devoted to
some foundational issues. Finally, Section 6 contains extensions and further
discussion.
62. The Model
We consider an economy consisting of m assets, a1,... ,a, and n (risk
neutral) individuals 1,... ,n. The economy begins at date 0, and at this
point organizational form is chosen. Each asset represents a decision that
has to be made in the future at date 1.These decisions are noncontractible
both ex ante and ex post. However, authority over decisions can be allocated
at date 0, as can the tasks that people are engaged in.
For simplicity we assume that all individuals are identical. At
date 0 each individual is assigned a task.(More than one person can be
assigned the same task.) A task consists of trying to come up with an idea
about what to do with a subset of the m assets, i.e., what decisions to make
with respect to these assets at date 1. For each set A c A ={a1,..
.,a},
there is a corresponding task t(A). Not all tasks reach fruition, that is,
become ideas. We write the probability that task t(A) becomes an idea as
p(A), where 0 <p(A)<1.
An individual who has an idea about the subset of assets A, and is able
to implement it, generates value v(A)0 (measured in money). We put few
restrictions on the function v, other than to suppose that v({ak}) >0for
all k. In particular, v may depend on the identity of the assets in A as
well as on their number. Also v may not be superadditive or even
nondecreasing in A.
This last point deserves discussion. We have in mind a situation where
thinking about how to use two assets is a very different activity from
thinking about how to use one of them. The first activity involves
coordination while the second does not. If coordination possibilities are
limited, then the value of having an idea about how to coordinate two assets
may be very low. Thus v({a1, a2}) could be smaller than v({a1H +
oreven than Mm [vNa1fl v({a2})] if synergies between the assets are
7sufficiently small.3
We will make the following (quite strong) assumptions about the
generation of value:
(Al) To realize v(A), an individual carrying out task t(A) needs access to
all the assets in A.If he has an idea but has access only to a
non—empty, strict subset of A, he obtains a positive, but
insignificant, value.
(A2)(No externalities.) All the value from an idea accrues to the
individual whose idea it is (think of a pet project).In particular,
ideas cannot be transferred: i cannot carry out j's idea.
(A3) Having an idea is an independent event across individuals.
(A4) There is no ex post renegotiation (e.g., because of shortage of time).
That is, authority cannot be bought and sold at date 1.
We suspect that not all of these assumptions (except possibly for
(A4)) are essential, but they greatly simplify the analysis. We discuss CA4)
further in Section 5.Note that, as will be seen below, it is the absence of
costless ex post renegotiation that provides a role for hierarchical
3Take the hotel—plane example of the introduction. Consider the comparison
between the profit from offering hotel discounts to airplane passengers and
the profit from refurbishing the hotel and charging higher hotel prices. The
first may be bigger than the second if the plane flies to an airport near the
hotel; but smaller if it does not.
8structure in our model.In fact, we view hierarchical structure as a
substitute for ex post renegotiation.
(Al) -(A4)have a simple but useful implication:
(*) An individual who has an idea and can implement it (even if only
partially, i.e., even if he obtains only an insignificant value) will
always do so; he will never defer to someone junior, however
productive the junior person is. Also a senior individual who is
inactive will never wish to veto the idea of a subordinate.
The first part of (*) follows from the fact that, if a senior person
with an idea defers to a junior person, he loses his private value (for which
he cannot be compensated-—given (A4)). The second part follows from the fact
that, given (A2), a senior person without an idea neither gains nor loses
from his subordinate's idea.
We now turn to the allocation of authority at date 0. We associate
with each asset a hierarchy of bosses, that is, a chain of command.
Formally, a chain of command is a list, i.e., a sequence of a subset of the
numbers l,...,n (the list may contain all the numbers l,...,n, none of the
numbers, or a strict subset of the numbers; no number is repeated). The
first number in the list refers to the ultimate boss, the second number to
his subordinate, the third number to the subordinate's subordinate, and so
on. Given a chain of command, the most senior person on the list with an
idea implements it.If no one in the chain has an idea, the asset yields
zero value.
We define an organizational form at date 0 to be a delineation of a
chain of command for each asset and an assignment of tasks to each
individual. We assume that both the chain of command and the tasks can be
9specified in an enforceable contract.4
We make a final assumption:
(A5) There is costless (Coasian) bargaining at date 0, and individuals are
not wealth-constrained.
(A5) is in stark contrast to (A4). We have in mind that there is
plenty of time for the parties to negotiate at date 0, but very limited time
(no time) to negotiate at date 1.(A5) implies that organizational form will
be chosen at date 0 to maximize expected total surplus, with the surplus
being divided up using lump sum transfers.
Before we write down the formula for expected surplus, we can simplify
matters a little. Suppose an individual's task consists of looking after
assets in the subset A.Then it makes no sense to put the individual in the
list (chain of command) involving an asset akA, since the individual will
never have an idea about ak.
Similarly, suppose an individual is assigned the task t(A). Then it
makes no sense p, to put him in the list (chain of command) involving each
asset ak E A, since he generates no significant value unless he has control
over each of the assets in A.
Putting these two observations together, we can conclude the following.
Once the lists for all the assets have been determined, we can figure out
which task each person is doing by seeing which list he appears in: if the
union of the lists he appears in corresponds to the set of assets A, then he
will be doing task t(A).
41n Section 6 we briefly discuss what happens if tasks are noncontractible.
10An example might be useful at this point. Suppose there are two assets
and four people (in =2,n =4).Figure 1 illustrates three possible
organizational forms.
1 1
2 2 1 1
3 3 2 2 1 3
4 4 3 4 2 4
a1 a2 a1 a2 a1 a2
(i) (ii) (iii)
Figure 1
In the first form, 1 is the boss ofa1 and a2, and has 2, 3, and 4 as
subordinates on both assets. The tasks correspond to this assignment of
authority: all four individuals are engaged in looking after both assets. In
the second form, 1 is the boss of both assets, 2 is l's subordinate ona1 and
a2, 3 is 2's subordinate on a1, and 4 is 2's subordinate on a2. Again, the
tasks correspond: 1 and 2 look after a1 anda2, 3 looks after a1 and 4 looks
after a2. In the third form, 1 is the boss of asseta1, 2 is his
subordinate on a1, 3 is the boss ofa2, and 4 is his subordinate on a2. 1
and 2 look after a1 and 3 and 4 look after
a2.
The forms have a natural economic interpretation. The first two
represent a single firm since both assets have the same ultimate boss,
individual 1 (who can be interpreted as the owner of the assets). The second
form can be thought of as corresponding to a more decentralized firm than the
11first because authority is more likely to be exercised by someone with a
narrow remit——a specialist——and less likely to be exercised by a coordinator
(in the second form, 3 or 4 gets to exercise authority if 1 and 2 don't have
an idea). Finally, the third form represents two firms since assets a1 and
a2 have different ultimate bosses: 1 is the boss of a1, 3 is the boss of a2.
We now write down the general formula for expected total surplus in the
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v(A.) if and only if i has an idea and
assets i looks after has an idea. Given








According to (A5), organizational form will be chosen to maximize
123. An Example and the Main Theorem
In this section we establish some general results about optimal
organizations. Part (a) of Theorem 1 provides a surprisingly powerful
characterization of an optimal hierarchy. It says that an optimal
organizational form has the property that an individual's place in the
hierarchy is determined (entirely) by his probability of having an idea:
individuals with the lowest probability of having an idea are placed at the
top of the hierarchy, individuals with the next lowest probability of an idea
are placed next in the hierarchy, and so on. Part (b) (which pretty much
follows from part (a)) says that criss—cross arrangements are never optimal.
That is, if j is above i on one asset, i will never be above j on another
asset.
Before we state Theorem 1, and two corollaries, it is useful to get
some intuition from a special case. Suppose there are two assets, a1 and a2,
and two individuals, 1 and 2 (m =n=2).Given our assumption that
individuals are identical, but assets may not be, there are nine distinct
organizational forms.(In what follows, everything is unique up to the
permutation of the individuals' names.) To see this, note that there are two
organizational forms where both individuals look after both assets (2 can be
senior to 1 on both, or senior on one and junior on the other); four forms
where 2 looks after two assets and 1 looks after one (2 can be senior or
junior on the asset 1 looks after; and 1 can look after a1 or a2); and three
forms where 1 and 2 both look after one asset (they can look after different
assets or the same asset, which may be a1 or a2).
Some of these forms are illustrated in Figure 2.(We leave out the
symmetric version of (iii), (iv) and (v), where assets a1 and a2 are
reversed.)
132 2 1 2 2 2
1 1 2 1 1
a1 a2 a1 a2 a1 a2
Ci) (ii) (iii)
1 2 1
2 2 1 2
a1 a2 a1 a2 a1 a2
(iv) Cv) (vi)
Figure 2
Forms (i), (iii), (v) and (vi) make good economic sense. We would
expect form (i) to be desirable if coordination is very important; form (iii)
to be desirable if some coordination is important but not too much; form Cv)
to be desirable if coordination is not valuable and a1 is very productive;
and form (vi) to be desirable if coordination is not valuable and both assets
are comparably productive.(Each of these forms can be shown to be optimal
for a suitable choice of the parameters.)
However, forms (ii) and (iv) seem strange. Does it make sense to have
someone coordinate and yet be junior on some asset, given that this implies
that he will rarely be able to implement his coordination idea?
Fortunately, (ii) is never optimal, and neither is (iv) (under an
14additional assumption). To see this, note that the expected surpluses

















where v1 =v(a1}),v2 =v({a1,a2}),p1 =p({a1}),p2 =p({a1,a2}).
(To
understand these formulae, note that in Ci) coordination occurs if either 1
or 2 (or both) is active; in (ii) coordination occurs if exactly 1 or 2 is
active (but not both); in (iii) coordination occurs if 2 is active whether or
not 1 is active; and in (iv) coordination occurs if 2 is active but 1 is
not.)
it is immediate that V2 <
V1and so (ii) is not optimal. To see
whether (iv) can be optimal, note that, if it is, we must have V4 a V1 and V4
a V5. The first implies p1v1 a p2 v2 (1 +p1
—
p2),while the second implies
a p1v1. These cannot both be true, as long as we are prepared to assume
p2 <p1.
This example illustrates the theorem (and corollaries) stated below:
(a) If individual 2's task is such that he has a lower probability of an idea
than individual 1, then it is not optimal to put 1 above 2 on any asset ((iv)
is not optimal).(b) Criss—cross arrangements are not optimal, i.e., it
cannot be the case that 2 is above 1 on one asset and 1 is above 2 on another
((ii) is not optimal).
Without the monotonicity assumption on probabilities, p2 <p1,wecannot
15rule out organizational forms like (iv).In the above example, let v1 =10,
=8,p1 =1/4,p2
1.Then direct calculation shows that (iv) is
optimal.5
Let us return to the m asset, n individual case. Recall from Section 2
that A. is the set of assets over which i can exercise authority and Lk is
the list (chain of command) associated with asset ak. We now state the main
theorem.
Theorem 1.Consider an optimal organizational form.
(a)Suppose p(A.) > p(Ai. Then, for all assets ak E A. n A., j appears
above i on list Lk.
(b)Criss—cross arrangements are not optimal, i.e. ,ifj appears above i on
list Lk for asset ak then there does not exist k' such that i appears
above j on list Lk, for asset ak,.
Proof: See appendix.
Notice that, when p(A.)p(AJ, part (b) of the theorem follows
immediately from part (a). The heart of part (b), therefore, lies in showing
that criss—cross arrangements are also not optimal when p(A.) =p(A.).
Of course, the leading case where p(A.) =p(A.)is when A. =A.:part
5Although (iv) may be optimal whenp2 > p1, we can rule out (iii) in this
case.It follows from direct calculation that p2 > p1either V3 < V1 or V3
< V5. This finding provides another illustration of part (a) of Theorem 1:
If a specialist has a lower probability of an idea than a coordinator (p2 >
then it is not optimal to put a coordinator above a specialist on any
asset ((iii) is not optimal).
16(b) of the theorem then says that, given two people with the same remit, one
should be senior to the other on all the assets they work on. Below we state
a corollary that deals with the more interesting case where A. c A. A.A.,
1J 1 J
i.e., j's remit is broader than i's.
First, we make an observation about Theorem 1. Part (a) at first looks
a little suspicious.It would appear that the decision about who to put on
top of a hierarchy is determined solely by the probability of the success of
an idea and not at all by the value of an idea. For example, suppose p(A.)
and v(A.) are very low. Then putting j at the top of the hierarchy is very
inefficient, and yet the theorem suggests that this is optimal. The reason
there is no contradiction is that the theorem says nothing about which tasks
should be carried out. Given that j has a low probability of success and is
unproductive even when he has an idea, j is clearly doing the wrong task.
That is, in an optimal organizational form no—one will be doing task t(A.).
This observation about unproductive individuals with low probabilities
having the wrong tasks gives the clue to how part (a) of the Theorem is
proved. Take an asset ak, and suppose that agent i is senior to agent j on
list Lk, but p(A.) > (A). In broad terms, we show that expected surplus
can be increased by making one of two changes to the organizational form.
Either i is relatively unproductive (v(A.) is relatively low), in which case
expected surplus can be increased by switching i to task t(A.) and placing
him just under j in seniority on all assets in A.-—akin to changing from
hierarchy (iv) to hierarchy (i) in Figure 2 (with i1, A. {a1}, j2, A.
{a1,a2}, and aka1). Or j is relatively unproductive (v(A.) is relative
low), in which case expected surplus can be increased by switching j to task
t(A.) and placing her just under i in seniority on all assets in A.-—akin to
changing from hierarchy (iv) to hierarchy (v). The merit of these two kinds
of maneuver is that one can keep track of how overall expected surplus
17changes. By contrast, if we consider a third kind of change to the
organizational form, the ostensibly more straightforward maneuver of simply
switching the seniorities of i and j, then the people who lie between i and j
(on list Lk) are affected in subtle ways and so the overall change to
expected surplus is complicated.(In terms of our earlier two—person
analysis, this third maneuver amounts to switching the seniorities of 1 and 2
on asset a1; i.e., changing from hierarchy (iv) to hierarchy (iii). This
method happens to work when there are just two people, but not if there are
others in between them.)
Corollary 1 follows directly from Theorem 1, given a further
assumption.
Monotonicity (M). p(A) > p(B) if A c B, A B.
Corollary .1..Assume (M). Consider an optimal organizational form. Suppose
A. c A., A. A., where i, j E {1,. .. ,n}.Then, for each asset a such that
1 j 1 j k
ak E A., j will appear above i on list Lk.
Corollary 1 says that, under the assumption that the probability of an
idea is decreasing in an individual's span of control, it is optimal for
someone with a broad remit to be senior to someone with a narrow remit.
Assumption CM) warrants further discussion. We would argue that this
assumption is plausible. Consider the two functions p(A) and v(A) as the set
A increases.It would be surprising if p and v moved in the same direction.
If p and v both increase, this would say that coordinators are supermen,
while if p and v both decrease, it would say that specialists are supermen.
It is more likely that p and v move in opposite directions, i.e., p falls and
v rises, or p rises and v falls. The first of these seems more reasonable
18than the second: that is, it seems to accord with common sense that a
coordinator can (on average) achieve a sizable efficiency gain if he has an
idea, but that he is not that likely to have an idea.(Note, however, that
(M) requires only that p is decreasing in A; it does not require that v is
increasing in A.
Corollary 1 covers only the case where the remits of individuals can be
ranked. To this extent, the corollary leaves open the possibility that
someone can have two bosses (a non-pyramidal hierarchical structure). That
is, person i may be senior to person j on one asset; while person i' is
senior to person j on another asset, whereas i is not. This can happen if
the remits of persons i, j and i' cannot be ranked.
For example, consider the situation illustrated in Figure 3. There are
three individuals and six assets, and synergies exist only between assets a1,
a2, a3, assets a4, a5, a6, andassets a3, a4.
1 1 2 2 2
3 3






1. Then it is straightforward to show that
it is optimal to put individual 1 in charge of a1,a21a3, individual 2 in
charge of a4,a5,a6, and to make individual 3 a subordinate on a3,a4.
Individual 3 then has different bosses on a3 and a4.
19In order to rule out this kind of situation, we need a further
assumption.
Let us define a set of assets A to be synergistic if v(A) > 0.
Nestednedness (N). Synergies are nested if given two synergistic sets A, B,
either A c B, or B c A, or A B =0.
In other words, (N) says that if there is a synergy between a set of
assets, then any synergy involving one of the set and a new asset requires
the presence of the other assets in the set too.If synergies are nested,
the situation in Figure 3 cannot arise, since if {a3, a4} is a synergistic
set (which is why 3 is working on these assets), then {a1, a2, a3} is not a
synergistic set (and so 1 will not work on these assets).
(N) is quite strong. Note, however, that it is trivially satisfied in
the two asset case.
Corollary 2.Assume (M) and (N). Consider an optimal
organizational form.If j appears above i on list Lk for some asset ak, then
j appears above i on every list on which i appears.
The proof of Corollary 2 is direct. Suppose i looks after the set
of assets A. and j looks after the set of assets A.. A. and A. must be
1 J 1 J
synergistic since otherwise one of the individuals creates zero value and
expected surplus could be increased by assigning this individual to a single
asset (any one) and making him the most junior person on this asset.It
follows from (N) that A. c A., A. c A. or A. r A. =0.The last is
1 J J 1 1 J
impossible since j appears above i on some asset.If A. c A.., A. A., the
20conclusion of Corollary 2 follows from Corollary 1.If A. =A.,the
conclusion follows from Theorem 1, part (a).Finally, A. c A., A.A.,is
inconsistent with Corollary 1 since we know that i does not appear above j on
list Lk.
At this point it is worth returning to the two asset—two individual
example. Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 imply—-and we have also observed this
from direct calculation——that the organizational forms (ii) and (iv) in
Figure 2 cannot be optimal (assuming p2 <p1).In fact, if we are prepared
to make the additional assumption of symmetry (v({a1}) =v({a2}),p({a1}) =
p({a2})),(iii) and (v) can also be ruled out. To see this, note that the
expected surplus from organizational form (vi) is given by
V6 =2p1v1,
which is obviously greater than V5.(This is just an implication of
diminishing returns. )In addition, it is easy to show that either V6 >
V3
or
V1 >V3(so (iii) is not optimal).
So in the two asset-two individual example, the optimal arrangement is
symmetric: either there should be two coordinators (as in (1)) or no
coordinators (as in (vi)).
In the next section, we will show that symmetry always holds in the two
asset case when the number of individuals (n) is even. This has an
interesting implication for Figure 1.In Figure 1 we illustrated three
possible organizational forms for the two asset-four individual case.It
turns out that, under symmetry, these are the only candidates for optimality
(as the next section will show). Moreover, the trade—off between them is as
one would expect (at least if p1 >p2,p1 not too close to p2). Form (1) is
optimal if the gains to coordination are large enough; (ii) is optimal if the
21gains to coordination are moderate; and (iii) is optimal if the gains to
coordination are small.
224. The Symmetric Two Asset Case
In this section we analyze in detail the case of n individuals and two
symmetric assets (m =2).We refer to an individual who looks after both
assets as a cordinator and an individual who looks after one asset as a
specialist. The values they generate if they have an idea and exercise
authority over the appropriate assets are given by v2, v1, respectively
(i.e., v2v({a1,a2}), v1v({a1}) =v({a2})).The probabilities of having
an idea are given by p2, p1, respectively (i.e., p2 =p({a1,a2)), p1 =
p({a1})
=p({a2fl).
We assume p1 >p2.Hence, from the Theorem, coordinators will be
senior to specialists and, given any two coordinators, one will be senior to









23In Figure 4 there are r coordinators and (n —r)specialists. Note that the
optimal organization may not be symmetric, i.e. ,thenumber of specialists,
s, on asset a1 need not be the same as the number of specialists, n -r—s,
on asset a2.
In fact it turns out that the optimal organization is symmetric, i.e.,
s =n—r-s,except in the case where n is odd and there are no
coordinators at all.





and p1 >p2.Consider an optimal
organizational form in which individuals 1,... ,r look after both assets (A. =
{a,a }fori =1,...,r), individuals r +1,...,r +slook after asset a (A. 12 1
=
{a1}
for i =r+1,...,r +s)and individuals r +s+1,...,n look after




The key step in proving Result 1 is to show that if there is some
coordination Cr >0)and, say, one more specialist working on asset a1 than
on asset a2 Cs =a-r-s+1),then it would be better either for the most
junior coordinator to switch to specializing on a2, or for the extra'
specialist on asset a1 to switch to coordination. Either way, the number of
specialists on a1 and a2 should be equalized: an asymmetric compromise is
never optimal. And if there are no coordinators Cr =0),the number of
specialists on each asset should be as equal as possible-—i.e., the same when
n is even.
From now on, to simplify matters, we will assume that n is even, in
24which case the optimal organization is symmetric even if there are no
coordinators. As above, write the number of specialists on each asset as s.
Since n is even, the number of coordinators must also be even: r =n—2s.
We now consider the optimal choice of s. Before we get into the
details, let us note a simple way of thinking about this. Imagine that
everyone is a specialist, i.e., 2sn. Then the value of the organization
• n/2 . . is2(1 —(1—
p1)
)v1, which is a strictly concave function of n. In other
words, not surprisingly, there are diminishing returns to having more
specialists. As we will see, this has the following implication: in a class
of cases (more precisely, when the surplus maximization problem is convex,
and the solution to the problem is interior), then, after s has reached a
certain value, it is better not to have further specialists, but rather to
make any additional people in the organization (i.e., those at the top)
coordinators. That is, for large enough n, the optimal value of s is
independent of n.
However, this is not the only possibility. There is another class of
cases (when the surplus maximization problem is nonconvex) where the optimum
is a corner solution: s0 or s =n.
Now to the details. Denote by V the expected surplus (value) of an
organizational form in which there are s specialists on each asset and n —2s
coordinators. Suppose sn/2 —1.Let 8 be the probability that at least
one of the first (n —2s—2)coordinators is active (i.e., has an idea).
Then we can write
(4.1) V=8v+(1-O)V, s 2 s
where V is the value of the organizational form (call it 'hat') consisting
of everyone the first (n —2s—2)coordinators, i.e., the organizational
25form consisting of 2 coordinators and s specialists below them on each asset.
The justification for (4.1) is that if one of the first (n —2s-2)
coordinators is active, which happens with probability 0, v is realized;
while, if not, V is realized.
S





where W is the value of the organizational form consisting of s specialists
working on asset a1 (or a2). The justification for (4.2) is that in the
organizational form 'hat, the probability that at least one of
the coordinators is active is (1 —(1—
p2)2),
in which case v2 is realized;
otherwise 2W is realized.
S
Now increase s by 1. Since there are now 2 more specialists
altogether, the number of coordinators falls to n -2s-2.Using the same
logic as above, we can write
(4.3) V÷1 =0v2
+ (1 —0)
where V41 is the value of an organizational form consisting of (s + 1)







out some manipulation, and using the fact that W =(1—qS)vwe obtain
(45)V V V V




(4.5) provides us with important (marginal) information; it tells us when
total value can be raised by increasing the number of specialists on each
asset from s to s +1(and correspondingly reducing the number of
coordinators by 2).
In what follows, it is helpful to consider separately the cases q1q2
and q1 <q2.
(The first is likely to occur when p1p2 and the second when
p1 >>
Case1: q1q2
From (4.5), the crucial inequality is:




Now if q1q2 the left—hand side (LHS) is nonpositive and increasing in s.
The right—hand side (RHS) may be positive or negative, but it is constant.
It follows that if (4.6) holds at a particular value of s, it also holds at s
+1,i.e.,
(4.7) V V =V V
si-i s s+2 s+1
(4.7) tells us that the problem of maximizing V in Case 1 is
nonconvex. An implication is that an interior value of s is never (uniquely)
optimal (if 0 <s<n/2maximizes V ,thenV" V and so, from (4.6), V
S s s—i n/2
V, which is a contradiction). Hence, in Case 1, we have a corner
S
solution:s =0or s =n12.











It follows that, if v22v1, s =0is optimal (since q1q2); while, if v2
<2v1,
s =n/2is optimal for large enough n (since q2"2, q1"2 -0as n -
Theresults for Case 1 are summarized in Result 2.
Result .Assumem =2;the assets are symmetric; n is even; p1 >p2;and q1
q2, where q1 =1-
p1and q2 (1 -p2)2.Then if v22v1, it is optimal
to have n coordinators on the two assets (a completely centralized firm). On
the other hand, if v2 <2v1,then, for large enough n, it is optimal to have
n/2 specialists on each asset (two independent firms).
The intuition behind Result 2 is straightforward.If v22v1,
coordination adds value. Since q1 q (i.e., p2 is not much smaller than
p1), the expected return from coordination is also quite large.It is
therefore not surprising that all individuals will be assigned to the task of
coordination. On the other hand, if V2< 2v1,two specialists create more
value than one coordinator, conditional on all of them having ideas..
Moreover, when n is large, the probability that at least one of n
coordinators is active, or that at least one of n/2 specialists is active, is
close to 1. So value, conditional on having an idea, is the only thing that
matters.It follows that specialization is better when v2 <2v1.
We turn next to the case q1 <q2.
28Case 2: q1 < q
In Case 2 the LHS of (4.6) is positive and decreasing in s, while the
RHS is constant.It follows that, if (4.6) fails to hold for s =0,it fails
to hold for all s.Hence (q2 -q1)
(1 -
q2)(-i..- 1)is a sufficient
condition for V1 V everywhere. In other words, if
1 -
(4.8) v 2v I
2l1—q2
then V is maximized at s =0.
S
At the other extreme, if V22v1, the RHS of (4.6) is nonpositive and
so the LHS > RHS for all s.In this situation V V for all s, i.e., s = s+l s
n12isoptimal.
The interesting parameter range in Case 2 is where
v)l-q
(4.9) 2 <—- < 2 I
v1 l—q2
In this range, V > V for small s, and V < V for large s. To be more
s+1 5 s+1 5
precise, when (4.9) holds, the problem of maximizing V is convex and there is
an interior solution (for large enough n) characterized by the "first order
condition": V V > V .Writethe optimal value as s. From (4.5), s
s—i s s+i
is given by the smallest integer greater than or equal to the solution x of
(l—q) ,v x 2 i2
(4.10) q= t — 1
1 (q2q1) 12v1
29The results for Case 2 are summarized in Result 3.






(1) If v 2v I
1
I,itis optimal to have n coordinators on the two
2ll -q2j
assets (a completely centralized firm).
(2) If v22v1, it is optimal to have n/2 specialists on each asset (two
independent firms).
V2l-q1. —
(3)If 2 < < 2 I I, itis optimal to have (n—2s) coordinators
v1 l —q2)
on the assets, with s specialists below them on each asset, where s is the
smallest integer greater than or equal to the solution of (4.10).
The thrust of Result 3 is similar to that of Result 2.The higher v2
is relative to 2v1, the greater are the gains from coordination and the more
coordinators one would expect to have. Result 3 tells us that, if (v2/2v1)
is high enough, everyone will be a coordinator (complete centralization).If
(v2/2v1) is low enough, no one will be a coordinator (two independent firms).
In between there will be a mix of senior coordinators and junior specialists
(a decentralized firm); moreover, the number of specialists is increasing in
(v2/2v1).
One aspect of the interior solution (part (3) of Result 3) deserves
30particular mention. Provided n is large enough (specifically, provided n >
2s),the optimal number of specialists on each asset is independent of n!
This is an instance of a more general idea: the shape of an optimal
sub—hierarchy——that is, everyone below a group of senior coordinators——is
independent of how many senior coordinators there are in that group. The
reason is that the sub—hierarchy makes a contribution to the organization if
and only if no one in the group of senior coordinators is active. Let us
call this event E. By assumption (A3), E is statistically independent of
which agents in the sub—hierarchy are active. Hence, for a given number of
agents in the sub—hierarchy, the optimal design of the sub—hierarchy is
independent of E: conditioning on an independent event does not change the
nature of the design problem. In particular, for the parameter values in
part (3) of Result 3, consider the sub—hierarchy of (say) m people,
comprising the s specialists on each asset together with the m —2smost
junior coordinators (take m >2s).Then the optimality of this sub—hierarchy
is unaffected by the number, n -m,of senior cooordinators. As the total
number, n, of agents grows, provided the optimal number, s, of specialists on
each asset has been reached, all additional agents should be assigned to be
coordinators. Of course, for large n the event E (the event that none of the
n —msenior coordinators is active) becomes extremely unlikely; but that
does not affect the optimality of having just s specialists on each asset.
Given this logic, it is not surprising that in all cases in Results 2
and 3, the optimal number of coordinators, n -2s,grows as n grows.In
effect, an increase in n leads to larger, more centralized firms. To put it
another way, a fall in the opportunity cost of workers would make it optimal
to have bigger, more centralized firms. We shall return to this point in
Section 6
Finally, there are some other comparative statics properties that
31follow from Results 2 and 3.First, if falls (i.e., p2 rises),
centralization increases (i.e., the number of specialists, s, does not rise).
This is intuitive since the probability of a coordinator having an idea has
increased. Second, if q1 falls (i.e., p1 rises), inspection of (4.10)
reveals that s can rise or fall, i.e., centralization may decrease or
increase. The intuition for this is that, although the returns to
specialization have increased, which suggests that the number of specialists
should rise, diminishing returns to specialization will set in earlier, i.e.,
it may not be necessary to have as many specialists.
325. Foundational Issues
In this section we discuss further some of the assumptions that we have
made.
The model is one of symmetric information and there are no ex ante
investments. What matters are ex post decisions. The decisions are
noncontractible both ex ante and ex post, but the right to make them can be
allocated ex ante (think of allocating the right to press a button).
An obvious question to ask is, why doesn't the Coase theorem apply here,
i.e., why don't then individuals simply sit down at date 1 and negotiate
over who can press which button? (The tasks would presumably still be agreed
on contractually at date 0.) A related question is, even if the Coase
theorem doesn't apply, aren't there perhaps mechanisms other than the
assignment of authority through hierarchy that could do a better job
of maximizing total surplus?
The first point to notice is that in some cases a hierarchical
structure can achieve a remarkably efficient outcome——even the first-best.
Take the two asset, n individual case analyzed in Section 4 (where n is
even). Suppose v2 >2v1. According to Results 2 and 3,the optimal
hierarchy has (n —2s)coordinators on the two assets, with s specialists
junior to them on each individual asset (where s may be zero). It is easy to
see that this arrangement yields an ex post efficient outcome since (a) if
one or more coordinators has an idea, then one of these ideas will be
implemented (since coordinators are senior); (b) a coordinator creates at
least as much value as two specialists combined (and so if a coordination
idea exists, it is efficient to implement it).
In fact, this hierarchical structure is also ex ante efficient; that
is, surplus cannot be increased by reassigning tasks. The reason is that,
when v2 >2v1,
the above argument shows that, given any assignment of tasks,
33ex post value can be maximized through a hierarchical structure (in which
coordinators are senior to specialists). Thus it is impossible to find an
assignment of tasks, and an ex post rule for implementing ideas, that creates
more value than the optimal hierarchy. Hence, when v2 >2v1,the
optimal hierarchy identified in Results 2 and 3 achieves thefirst—best.6
In general, of course, a hierarchy will not achieve the first—best. We
now try to provide two (very tentative) justifications for being interested
in hierarchies in this case too.
First, suppose that having an idea corresponds to being active or
"awake," and not having an idea corresponds to being passive or "asleep."
Moreover, being "asleep' means being totally incommunicado (e.g., the person
is away from the office). Then renegotiation or revelation-type mechanisms
that require the participation of all the parties are infeasible, since those
who do not have ideas cannot be included.
It is still possible to have renegotiation or mechanisms involving only
those who are active at date 1.In fact, this issue is key. Determining the
ex post outcome when more than one person is active is what the analysis is
6The casev2 <2v1
is a bit more complicated. Results 2 and 3 tell us that
(when n is large) the optimal hierarchy has n/2 specialists on each asset.
Since there are no coordinators, this arrangement is trivially ex post
efficient. However, we suspect that the outcome may not be ex ante
efficient. That is, it may be possible to increase surplus by having some
coordinators and some specialists, in combination with a nonhierarchical
structure: this nonhierarchical structure would have the feature that a
coordinator gives up authority to a specialist if and only if there is at
least one specialist on each asset with an idea.(See footnote 7 for a
related point.)
34all about: given that decisions do no harm, if only one person is active, his
decision should be implemented.
We take the view that time pressure at date 1 may make it very costly
to have an elaborate exchange of messages or renegotiation even among those
who are active. Instead the parties may want to rely on an ex ante mechanism
that is "simple." A hierarchical structure is a leading example of such a
mechanism. Under a hierarchy, individuals are ranked and the individual with
the highest rank among those who are active has the right to decide: complex
7
messages and side—payments at date 1 are thereby avoided.
7We are not suggesting that a hierarchy is necessarily the only mechanism
that is "simple." A hierarchy has the feature that an individual's ranking
does not depend on who the other active individuals are. However, one could
depart from this. For instance, take the example in Figure 3, but suppose
that v({a3, a4}) =15.Then the following mechanism achieves first—best (and
is more efficient than the hierarchy illustrated in Figure 3): If individuals
1 and 2 both have ideas, then individual 1 has authority over a3 and
individual 2 has authority over a4; in all other cases individual 3 has
authority over a3 and a4. This mechanism ensures that, in the event that
individual 3 has an idea and only one of individuals 1 and 2 has an idea, a
value of 15 is generated instead of 14. Enforcing a mechanism like this may
be difficult, however, to the extent that the number of people with ideas may
not be verifiable.
In future work it would be interesting to analyze the role of more
general mechanisms. Note that nondeterministic mechanisms are also a
possibility. For example, one could have a first—come/first—served rule,
where the person who first has an idea gets to implement it (see Lando
(1998)). We doubt that nondeterministic mechanisms have a useful role to
35The assumption that no communication or exchange of messages at all
is possible ex post is extreme. There is a second interpretation of our
model that is also of interest. Imagine that all ideas can in principle be
passed up to the top person in the organization, i.e., even if the boss does
not have an idea, he can still consider the ideas of others. The top person
is overloaded, however, and so cannot vet every idea carefully. Moreover, he
is (approximately) indifferent about which of his employees' ideas are
implemented since he does not benefit directly from them. Then the boss may
employ a simple 'satisficing rule (which is set up ex ante): he implements
his own idea if he has one; otherwise he ratifies or rubber—stamps whatever
his subordinate proposes. The subordinate behaves in the same way: he
proposes to the boss his own idea if he has one; otherwise he proposes
(ratifies / rubber-stamps) subordinate's idea. And so on. This second
interpretation also corresponds to our model, although the foundations for it
are less clear.
This second interpretation serves to distinguish the model from
Aghion—Tirole (1997). Aghion and Tirole (1997) differentiate between formal
and real authority. An owner has formal or legal authority but may not have
the information to exercise his authority. Instead he defers to an informed
subordinate whose preferences are not too different from his; the subordinate
has real authority.In our model, a senior individual has formal authority,
while a junior individual has real authority if he has an idea and his boss
does not. Aghion and Tirole's interpretation is that the senior individual
rubber-stamps the junior individual's proposal in this case since he doesn't
play in the present model.
36have a better proposal of his own.8
Aghion and Tirole focus on the case of two individuals. The question
is, what happens if there are more than two, e.g., there is one senior
individual and two junior individuals? One natural extension of Aghion—Tirole
is to suppose that the senior individual, if he does not have an idea of hi
own, considers the proposals of both the juniors and chooses the one he likes
better. According to this interpretation, no chain of command needs to be
set up in advance. All that matters is that one individual is designated the
boss: this individual then decides which proposal to favor on an ex post
basis.
In contrast we take the Aghion-Tirole model in a different direction.
We assume that the boss cannot decide between all the ideas of his employees
either because he is not there (he's asleep) or because he is overloaded.
Instead he uses a shortcut: he decides in advance who will have authority if
he can't exercise it, who will have authority if that person can't exercise
it, and so on. In other words, he decides on a chain of command.
Needless to say, the above discussion is quite preliminary. Providing
a more formal foundation for the model would be extremely desirable in future
research.
We close this section with some remarks about the other assumptions we
have made.(Al) -(A3)are all strong, but greatly simplify the analysis.
It would be interesting to examine cases where (a) the value of an idea does
not accrue entirely to the person having it, i.e., values are not purely
private (part of value may be contractible); (b) an individual can achieve
value even if he does not have access to all the assets corresponding to his
8For an alternative interpretation of theAghion—Tirole model, based on the
idea of an implicit contract, see Baker et al. (1999).
37task. Note that an implication of allowing for non—private values is that a
boss may sometimes defer to a subordinate if the subordinate has a better
idea than the boss; or may veto the idea of a subordinate if the idea creates
negative value for the boss.
It is also desirable to relax the assumption that the probability p(A.)
of having an idea is exogenous.In a more general model, p(A.) would depend
on individual i's effort decision, which in turn might depend on where i is
in the hierarchy. This would bring incentives into the picture and
would greatly enrich the analysis.
386. Further Discussion
We have established several results. First, we have shown that, given
the assumption that the probability of an idea is decreasing in the set of
assets being looked after, individuals with a broad remit, i.e., whose tasks
cover a large subset of assets, should appear higher in the chain of command
than those with a narrow remit. In other words, big thinkers or coordinators
should be senior to small thinkers or specialists. Second, we have shown
that 'criss—cross' hierarchies are never optimal; that is, if individual i
appears above individual j on one asset, j will not appear above i on another
asset. Third, if synergies are nested, the optimal hierarchy is a pyramid,
in the sense that each individual has at most one boss.
There are several ways in which our work could be extended. In Section
4 we analyzed the two-asset case and considered what happens to the optimal
hierarchy as the number of agents increases. We found that if coordination
occurs at all it increases (Results 2 and 3). However, this is not the only
margin of interest. One could also ask what happens as the number of assets
increases along with the number of agents (perhaps assets can be purchased at
a fixed price; perhaps the ratio of assets to individuals remains constant).
Depending on the nature of synergies, expansion might then take the form of
further specialists being hired rather than increased coordination.
In a similar fashion, one could fix the number of assets at more than
two and consider what happens as the number of agents increases. For
instance, suppose that there are four assets, a1, a2, a3, a4, and the
synergistic sets are {a1, a2), {a3, a4) and {a1, a2, a3, a4), in addition to
the singleton sets. We know from our two main results that the optimal
hierarchy consists of a combination of bosses (working on all four assets),
middle—level managers (working on a1, a2, and a3, a4, respectively) and
low-level employees (working on a1, a2, a3, a4, respectively). But the mix
39of these groups can be almost anything, depending on the parameters. For
example, it might be optimal to have very few or no middle—level managers; or
it might be optimal to have very few or no bosses. We suspect, however, that
Result 3 generalizes: that is, if the surplus maximization problem is convex
and the solution to the problem is interior (which means that low—level
employees, middle-level managers, and bosses are all hired), then after the
total number of agents has reached a critical level, all further people in
the organization will be bosses.
The case just described helps to cast light on the subtleties of the
term decentralization. Consider an organization with several bosses and
several low—level employees, but no middle—level managers. This organization
might be said to be centralized, given that a decision is likely to be made
by a boss (a high—level coordinator). However, the organization might be
said to be decentralized given that, if decisions are not made by a boss,
they are made by specialists.
On the other hand, consider an organization with no bosses, but many
middle—level managers and some low-level employees. This organization might
be said to be decentralized, given that a decision is never made by a
high—level coordinator (a boss). However, the organization might be said to
be centralized, given that decisions are usually made by middle—level
managers and rarely by specialists.9
9We should acknowledge that our concept of decentralization is far from
standard in the literature. It is not uncommon for economists to define
decentralization in terms of span of control. For example, an organization
where four workers report to one boss is said to be centralized, whereas an
organization where two pairs of workers report to two middle—level managers,
who in return report to a boss is said to be decentralized (see, e.g.,
40We turn now to some more general remarks about the model. First, it
is useful to relate it to the literature on the theory of the firm. The
property rights theory (see Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990),
and Hart (1995)) can be thought of as a special case of the current model in
which an owner of an asset is always able to exercise control. In effect,
p(A) =1for all A (there is no uncertainty). There is still a nontrivial
allocation decision even under these conditions. For example, suppose m =n
=2(two assets and two individuals). Then the choice is between putting one
person in charge of a1 and a2 and getting v({a1, a2}); or putting one person
in charge of a1 and the other in charge of a2 and getting v({a1}) +
Apartfrom uncertainty, another important difference between the
current model and the standard property rights model is that the current
model ignores effort (or investment) incentives. As a consequence, the
current model is probably biased toward finding that large firms are optimal.
For example, consider Result 3 of Section 4, which says that, given an
interior solution, the optimal hierarchy becomes more centralized as the
number of workers increases. This result is much less likely to hold once we
take into account the fact that lower—level employees' effort incentives will
be dulled by the presence of many senior coordinators.
At the same time the property rights model, which is based on
entrepreneurial incentives, has a hard time explaining the existence of large
firms (except in the presence of very strong complementarities between
assets). Thus to have a theory that is biased in the direction of large
Wernerfelt (1992)). There does not seem to be a simple connection between
this notion of decentralization and ours. The reason is probably that the
one in the literature is based on information flowing up the system, whereas
ours is based on authority being imposed from above.
41firms may not be such a bad thing.
The current model exhibits another, more subtle bias toward large
firms. Given our assumption that tasks are contractible, there is in a
formal sense no limit to the size of a firm. Take a situation in which there
are two assets and two individuals, one looking after each asset. We have
interpreted this to represent two independent firms. However, one could also
interpret the situation to represent one firm with a single owner, who has
committed himself to look after only one asset. Of course, if tasks are
noncontractible, this equivalence breaks down: in general, the only way for
someone to commit himself to look after one asset is for him to give up the
legal right to intervene in a second asset.In future work it would be
desirable to drop the assumption that tasks are contractible. We conjecture
that this is unlikely to change our results about the nature of an optimal
hierarchy very substantially.
We end by mentioning two potential applications of the model. The
first is to understand how economies differ during periods of national
emergency ("war) as opposed to periods of normality ("peace'). There is a
sizeable informal literature arguing that centralization becomes more
desirable when urgent decisions are required. However, it has
been hard to formalize this idea.1° Our model seems well placed to deal with
this issue since it delivers the prediction that centralization is optimal
when coordination benefits are sufficiently great.
Second, ever since Chandler's work (Chandler (1962)), economists have
been interested in the choice between the U form and the M form.11 To
10For an interesting attempt in this direction, see Bolton and Farrell (1990).
11For a recent formalization, see Maskin, Xu and Qian (1999). For a
42understand this choice in our model, consider a stylized automobile company.
Suppose that there are four assets, a1, a2, a3, a4, where a1 represents an
asset for producing luxury cars, a2 represents an asset for producing family
cars, a3 represents an asset for marketing luxury cars and a4 represents an
asset for marketing family cars. One way to structure the automobile company
is to combine a1 and a2 in one division and a3 and a4 in another division.
This corresponds to the U form (organization by function). A second way to
structure the company is to combine a1 and a3 in one division and a2 and a4
in another. This corresponds to the M form (organization according to
self—contained units). It would be interesting to use the model to analyze
the trade—off between these two arrangements. Note that to do this it would
seem necessary to drop the assumption that synergies are nested (since
presumably there are synergies both between a1 and a2 and between a1 and a3).
discussion of how the U form and M form compare in their ability to solve
coordination problems, see Argyres (1995).
43APPENDIX (Proofs of Theorem and Result 1)
Proof of Theorem
Consider an optimal organizational form, and two individuals i and j
with tasks t(A.) and t(A.) respectively. To ease notation, let =p(A.)
and p. =p(A.).Suppose 0 <p.p. <1.Define
X =expectedsurplus conditional on neither i nor j being active;
X. =expectedsurplus conditional on i being active but j not;
X. =expectedsurplus conditional on j being active but i not;
X.. =expectedsurplus conditional on both i and j being active.
That is, the (unconditional) expected surplus equals
V =(1—p.)(1
—piX÷ p.(l —piX.÷(1 —
P)PJXJ
+ (A.l)
Since we are at an optimum, we know that no organizational form can generate
an expected surplus strictly in excess of V.That is, V is maximal.
Now consider a change to this organizational form. Give j the same
task as i (task t(A)) and move her immediately below i in seniority on the
lists pertaining to assets including those assets not in A. (j no longer
appears on the lists pertaining to those assets in A. that aren't in AJ.








Inequalities (A.2) and (A.3) will be of use in proving both parts (a) and
(b) of the Theorem.
Part (a): <
Suppose part (a) of the Theorem is false; i.e., there exists some ak E
A.rA such that i appears above j on list Lk and yet
< (A.4)
Conditional on i being active, j cannot implement any idea of her own
because i is senior to j on one of her assets, a E A..In effect, i has the
k j
seniority(at least, on asset ak) to block j: when i is active, j cannot
generate any value. Worse, when j too is active, not only is she blocked (by
i) from generating value herself, she in turn may block someone else who is
active but junior to her from implementing their idea. In short, conditional
on i being active, j's presence in the organization cannot raise expected
surplus:
X. . X.. (A.5)
13 1
Takentogether, (A.4) and (A.5) are incompatible with the maximality of V.
To see why, first perform some manipulations on (A.l)-(A.3). Take a
convex combination of 1/(2 —p)times (A.2) plus (1 -p.)/(2—p.)times
(A.3). Then substitute for V from (A.l), to yield
45p.(l —p.)(p.
-p.)
J 1 1 (x - X) +p.p.(X. -X..) 0. (A.6)
2—r 3 131 13
'1
If (A.4) and (A.5) hold, then (A.6) implies
X. X. (A.7)
J
Notice that (A.5) and (A.7) together say that j is making no
contribution to the organization, irrespective of whether i is active or
inactive.Indeed, combining (A.l), (A.5) and (A.7), we obtain
V (1 -p.)X+ p.X.; (A.8)
1 11
and the RHS of (A.8) is the expected surplus of the organization with j taken
out. Since V is maximal, (A.S) cannot hold as a strict inequality.
But j can make a positive contribution. Suppose her seniority is
lowered so that, for each asset ak. E she is placed at the bottom of list
Lk,. Now she is so junior that she can no longer block anyone. Moreover,
despite her junior status, she sometimes contributes v(A.) (when she is
active and no one senior to her is active). The modified organization thus
yields an expected surplus strictly in excess of the RHS of (A.8), which
contradicts the maximality of V. Part (a) of the Theorem is proved.
46Part (b): p. p...
As noted in the text, part (b) of the Theorem follows directly from
part (a) when p p. Therefore the only case we need consider is when p. =
pi.
For p. =p.,suppose part (b) of the Theorem is false. That is,
suppose there exists some asset ak E A.rA. such that i appears above j on
list and there exists another asset ak, E A.rA. such that j appears above
i on list Lk,..Then i and j block each other.
In particular, consider the event that i is active.j cannot implement
any idea of her own (because i is senior on asset ak). Moreover, when j too
is active she blocks i from implementing his idea (because j is senior on
asset ak,). Hence, conditional on i being active, j's presence in the
organization strictly reduces expected surplus:
X. .<X.. (A.9)
13 1
The symmetric argument holds, reversing the roles of i and j.So
X. .<X.. (A.iO)
13 3
Given p. =p.=p,say, we can substitute (A.9) and (A.lO) into (A.1)
to obtain
V < (1 -p)2X÷[1 -(1-p)2lmax{X.,X.}. (A.1l)
But (A.i1) contradicts one of (A.2) or (A.3). Part (b) of the Theorem
is proved. Q.E.D.
47Proof of Result 1
Suppose Result 1 is not true. Then there are two cases to consider.
Either (a) there exists an optimal organizational form for which r1 and
(without loss of generality) sn -r-s+1.Or (b) there exists an
optimal organizational form for which r =0and (again, without loss of
generality) sn —s+1,where n is even.
Case (a): r 1
Let 6 denote the probability that at least one of the most senior r —1
coordinators has an idea (if r1 then define 9 to equal 0):
=1-(1-)rl
Let Y1 denote the expected surplus generated by the bottom s -1
specialists on asset a1, conditional on none of the r +1people senior to
them (r coordinators and 1 specialist) having an idea (if s —1=0then
define to equal zero):
=[1-(1-p)S_llv (A.12)
Let denote the expected surplus generated by all the n —r—s
specialists on asset a2, conditional on none of the r coordinators senior to
them having an idea (if n —r-s=0then define to equal zero):
=[1-(1-p1)1v1.
(A.13)
48Note that given s a n -r—s+1,it follows from (A.12) and (A.13)
that
< v1. (A.14)









Consider an alternative organizational form. Change the task of the
most junior coordinator so that he is a specialist on asset a2, and make him
the most senior of such specialists. Leave everyone else's tasks and








Consider a second alternative. Starting from the original
organizational form, change the task of the most senior specialist on asset
a1 so that she is a coordinator, and make her the most junior coordinator.
Leave everyone else's tasks and seniorities unchanged. This second
alternative organizational form yields expected surplus
49V" =Ov




Given that the original organizational form is optimal, V'V and V"
V. From (A.15), (A.16) and (A.17), these inequalities can be simplified and
then combined to eliminate v2, yielding
p2v1 +(1 —
p2)Y1 Y2. CA.18)
But (A.18) contradicts (A.14).
Case (b): r =0and n even
When r =0,the organizational form yields expected surplus
V =[1-(1-)S} + [1 -(1-p1)5]v1.
Now move one of the specialists from asseta1 to asset a2. The new
expected surplus equals
V1 =[1-(1-p)S_l]v +[1 -(1-
Giventhat n is even and sn -S+ 1, V' is greater than V, which
contradicts the optimality of the original organizational form. Q.E.D.
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